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In Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs), promoting cooperative behavior is a challenging problem for mechanism designers. Cooperative actions, such as disseminating data, can seem at odds with rationality and may benefit other vehicles at a cost to oneself. Without additional mechanisms, it is expected that cooperative behavior in the population will decrease and eventually disappear. Classical game theoretical models for cooperation, such as the public goods game, predict this outcome, but they assume fixed population sizes and overlook the ecological dynamics of the interacting vehicles. In this paper, we propose an evolutionary public goods game that incorporates VANET ecological dynamics and offers new insights for promoting cooperation. Our model considers free spaces, population density, departure rates of vehicles, and randomly composed groups for each data sender. Theoretical analysis and simulation results show that higher population densities and departure rates, due to minimum differences between pay-offs of vehicles, promote cooperative behavior. This feedback between ecological dynamics and evolutionary game dynamics leads to interesting results. Our proposed model demonstrates a new extension of evolutionary dynamics to vehicles of varying densities. We show that it is possible to promote cooperation in VANETs without the need for any supporting mechanisms. Future research can investigate the potential for using this model in practical settings.
Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) systems are enhancing the delivery of services and boosting productivity in a wide array of industries, from manufacturing to healthcare. However, IIoT devices are susceptible to cyber-threats such as the leaking of important information, products becoming compromised, and damage to industrial controls. Recently, blockchain technology has been used to increase the trust between stakeholders collaborating in the supply chain in order to preserve privacy, ensure the provenance of material, provide machine-led maintenance, etc. In all cases, such industrial blockchains establish a novel foundation of trust for business transactions which could potentially streamline and expedite economic processes to a significant extent. This paper presents an examination of “Schloss”, an industrial blockchain system architecture designed for multi-factory environments. It proposes an innovative solution to increase trust in industrial networks by incorporating a fairness concept as a subsystem of an industrial blockchain. The proposed mechanism leverages the concept of taxes imposed on blockchain nodes to enforce ethical conduct and discipline among participants. In this paper, we propose a game theory-based mechanism to address security and trust difficulties in industrial networks. The mechanism, inspired by the ultimatum game, progressively punishes malicious actors to increase the cost of fraud, improve the compensation system, and utilise the reward reporting capabilities of blockchain technology to further discourage fraudulent activities. Furthermore, the blockchain’s incentive structure is utilised to reduce collusion and speed up the process of reaching equilibrium, thereby promoting a secure and trustworthy environment for industrial collaboration. The objective of this paper is to address lack of trust among industrial partners and introduce a solution that brings security and trust to the forefront of industrial blockchain applications.
The Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) holds significant potential for improving efficiency, quality, and flexibility. In decentralized systems, there are no trust based centralized authentication techniques, which are unsuitable for distributed networks or subnets, as they have a single point of failure. However, in a decentralized system, more emphasis is needed on trust management, which presents significant challenges in ensuring security and trust in industrial devices and applications. To address these issues, industrial blockchain has the potential to make use of trustless and transparent technologies for devices, applications, and systems. By using a distributed ledger, blockchains can track devices and their data exchanges, improving relationships between trading partners, and proving the supply chain. In this paper, we propose a model for cross-domain authentication between the blockchain-based infrastructure and industrial centralized networks outside the blockchain to ensure secure communication in industrial environments. Our model enables cross authentication for different sub-networks with different protocols or authentication methods while maintaining the transparency provided by the blockchain. The core concept is to build a bridge of trust that enables secure communication between different domains in the IIoT ecosystem. Our proposed model enables devices and applications in different domains to establish secure and trusted communication channels through the use of blockchain technology, providing an efficient and secure way to exchange data within the IIoT ecosystem. Our study presents a decentralized cross-domain authentication mechanism for field devices, which includes enhancements to the standard authentication system. To validate the feasibility of our approach, we developed a prototype and assessed its performance in a real-world industrial scenario. By improving the security and efficiency in industrial settings, this mechanism has the potential to inspire this important area.