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In Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs), promoting cooperative behavior is a challenging problem for mechanism designers. Cooperative actions, such as disseminating data, can seem at odds with rationality and may benefit other vehicles at a cost to oneself. Without additional mechanisms, it is expected that cooperative behavior in the population will decrease and eventually disappear. Classical game theoretical models for cooperation, such as the public goods game, predict this outcome, but they assume fixed population sizes and overlook the ecological dynamics of the interacting vehicles. In this paper, we propose an evolutionary public goods game that incorporates VANET ecological dynamics and offers new insights for promoting cooperation. Our model considers free spaces, population density, departure rates of vehicles, and randomly composed groups for each data sender. Theoretical analysis and simulation results show that higher population densities and departure rates, due to minimum differences between pay-offs of vehicles, promote cooperative behavior. This feedback between ecological dynamics and evolutionary game dynamics leads to interesting results. Our proposed model demonstrates a new extension of evolutionary dynamics to vehicles of varying densities. We show that it is possible to promote cooperation in VANETs without the need for any supporting mechanisms. Future research can investigate the potential for using this model in practical settings.
Climate change is one of the most challenging topics to the world and has been subject to international negotiations for more than 25 years, one of the main players being the USA.
Game theory, on the other hand, is a popular tool from economics, frequently used to analyze strategic situations such as international negotiations. Together, the insights from these topics can help understand why the USA’s president Donald Trump has announced to quit the Paris Agreement and which consequences this might have for the US, other countries and for the future of international climate change negotiations. In order to assess the different implications, this thesis gives some theoretical background and presents game theoretic findings on climate change negotiations. It will be found that, from a game theoretic point of view, different reasons might have caused the USA to take this decision and that there is a chance that a withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement could have some effect on the future of climate protection. However, a precise assessment would require further research on the topic.